For more than three decades Niklas Luhmann had explicitly pursued the ambitious project of developing a theory of the social based on systems theory (Luhmann, 1997a, page 11). When he died in 1998 his already published work had exceeded 400 articles and 60 monographs. (1) Although recognised as one of the most innovative social scientists of the 20th century in Germany, and well known in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Italy, Luhmann is not widely read in English and French social science. Moreover, his overall impact upon human geography has in general remained marginal. We regret this and use this opportunity to invite geographers to get critically involved with his theory of social systems.
``psychic and social systems, unlike machines and organisms, can be characterized by their use of meaning'' (Luhmann, 1995, page 3), they cannot exist without organisms and other material systems. At this level of analysis each type of system is autonomous. An organism is not a part of a psychic system, and a social system does not consist of psychic systems. Because these kinds of systems are operationally closed, they exist only as environments for each other. As a result of Luhmann's specific sociological concerns, social systems are differentiated into interactions, organisations, and societies.
Organisms are able to import matter and energy from their environment for their own reproduction; in that respect they are open systems. From an operational point of view, however, they are closed, as their autopoiesis consists only of interior activities. Operational closure also characterises social and psychic systems. Their autopoiesis does not consist of biochemical processes but of self-referential distinctions, which occur in the medium of meaning. Within psychic systems the operations take the form of consciousness and experiences; within social systems they take the form of communication (Luhmann, 1989; 1995, page 60) .
Although communications presuppose experiences and organisms as their carrying substratum, they have a certain steering capacity with respect to these`lower' levels of existence. Nevertheless, communications, experiences, and activities of organisms are different sorts of operations. Because their operations are not directly accessible to each other, these systems cannot replace each other but can only observe the operations of other systems as events in their environment.
The operational closure of these systems is best illustrated by Luhmann's notion of communication: an utterance becomes a part of communication only if a following utterance designates it as a messageöthat is, communication is an utterance together with information. Therefore, communications are determined by nothing else but communications (Luhmann, 1989, page 7) . Many sociological terminologies have departed from human beings and their interactions. Luhmann does not deny the existence of human beings, sounds, signs, and the corporeal world in general, but he insists that social systems exist only as the autopoiesis of communication. All other entities, including those preconditions of communication ösuch as minds, bodies, and signs, which extend communication in physical time^space öbelong to the environment of social systems (and vice versa) (1989, page 29) .
Whereas the second level of figure 1 represents a classification of categorically different systems, Luhmann introduces on the third level three analytical aspects of social systems. Interactions are social systems based on face-to-face contacts that provide copresence for psychic systems (1995) . To analyse social systems as interactions means to take their spatiotemporality into account: communication has to take place somewhere, at some time, with some people. In Luhmann's view, action theories (Weber, Schu« tz, Giddens, Habermas, etc) include``too much '' (1997a, page 32) . He decides to set out instead from the empirically empty notions of system and difference. Consequently, he interprets`actions' only as forms that emerge as a content of communication (1995, pages 137^175) . Organisations are autopoietic systems that consist of defined networks of communications or`programs' (Luhmann, 1997a, pages 826^847; 2000) . They provide a functional structure for communications, which is set up to achieve certain aims and to fulfill specific purposes. Organisations serve to execute complex tasks, and they usually establish criteria for taking decisions. Although organisations may depend on certain interactions (encounters, meetings, etc) the interactions are not constitutive of the organisations.
Finally, Luhmann defines society as the one and only social system that includes all communications which refer to each other (1997a, pages 78^91). Society is the totality of all social systems, a``concept for the unity of the totality of what is social '' (1995, page 408) . Only for pre-Columbian times might it be adequate to speak of a plurality of societies. Within modernity there is only one internally differentiated world society. As such, Luhmann is very critical of sociological theories that equate societies with populations of nation-states (1997a, pages 24^32).
Are social systems real?
Social systems are constituted as``self-referential objects. We can observe and describe these as systems only if we accept that they refer to themselves in every operation'' (Luhmann, 1995, page 437) . When a communication constitutes a previous communication as a communication, it simultaneously distinguishes it from all those other things in the world that are not communication. In this sense, all operations of autopoietic systems always constitute the difference between the system and its environment. Distinctions, however, are observations that constitute a difference between two sides and thereby relate these sides to each other. Observations, which are thus the application of distinctions,`open' the system for conditions of the environment, but as internal operations they`close' the system by distinguishing it from its environment (1997a, page 92^108). An observation relates and differentiates: it is a unity of difference.
A perceptive observer may now ask whether systems are real or merely constructions? Chapter one of Social Systems begins with a simple claim:``there are systems'' (Luhmann, 1995, page 12) , and also in many other texts Luhmann leaves no doubt that systems are`empirical'. If conversations, payments, or organisations are real, then social systems are also real. Luhmann's theory does not presuppose any transcendental entity, whether the nature, the human actor, the subject, the god, or the reality. By refraining from ontological presuppositions (1995, page 178), his epistemology is akin to pragmatic and poststructuralist approaches, such as Rorty's The Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) or Latour's Politiques de la Nature (1999). This, of course, affects the status of the theory of social systems:``Theoretically guided research ... can be nothing other than a self-referential social system, what's more, one among many, a subsystem of a subsystem of society, thus, one of very limited social scope'' (Luhmann, 1995, page 487 ).
Luhmann's theory of society Subsystems, codes, and programs According to Luhmann, a characteristic feature of modern society is its differentiation into a variety of functionally specialised subsystems (see table 1), such as economy, law, politics, religion, science, education, etc. None of these subsystems of society can be substituted for one another, let alone for all others:``Function systems cannot step in for, replace or even simply relieve one another'' (Luhmann, 1989 , page 48).
Consequently, within modern society there is no metaposition available from which one could observe the whole of society or even`speak' for it (pages 113^114).
Functional differentiation means that each subsystem in society operates on the basis of a specific internal code, usually based on binary distinctions (table 1) . For example, science operates on the code of true/false, and the legal system on legal/ illegal. Apart from science, no other system within society specialises in truth, although not all problems of truth are treated within science. Within the judicial system, for instance, the truth of testimonies is evaluated. This may happen in very differentiated and painstaking ways, but the legal system would hardly judge the truth of general hypothetical statements about causal relations, as does the system of science.
From the point of view of the system, its binary code is universally valid because it may be applied to all its objects: for example, to all statements (science) or to all actions (law). Binary coding excludes third possibilities, and, as soon as the code is applied to itself, either tautologies (`true is true') or paradoxes (`true is not true') are produced. Therefore, the binary code must not regulate its own application. This is instead the task of programs (Luhmann, 1989, pages 37, 39^40, 45) .
By providing a semantics that allows for the distinction of items, and by assigning relevances that guide the continuity of operations, programs set the context for the application of the code. Programs open the system to the world and establish links between operations of different specialised subsystems. At the same time, the binary code determines the main distinction that the system operates on; thus the operational closure of the system and its distinction from an environment. Compared with the relative stability of codes, programs may change quite easily. Within science, for instance, theories and methodologies are programs that define the range of meaningful problems; they indicate the circumstances of generating factual statements and the (Luhmann, 1995, page 461) . For Luhmann the economy is the totality of those operations that are executed by payments. Thus`payment' is the``elemental autopoietic process, the ultimate communication that composes the system, the one that cannot be broken down any further'' (page 461). Before modernity, so Luhmann claims, the economy in Europe was already coded by property, mainly of ground and soil, and this was the foundation of power in political societies. In modern terms, this form of property was not yet sufficiently differentiated. One is not able to juggle as arbitrarily with territories as one is with money (1989, page 52). Note that, to follow Luhmann's analytical approach, the material side of production does not belong to the economic system. It is only within the economy that money is a generalised medium of communication. It is a constitutive aspect of the closure and autonomy of the economy, and outside the economy it is just waste paper, mixed metal, or occupied memory. As payments on their own are quite meaningless, prices as`expectational programs ' (1995, page 462) are needed in order to indicate the conditions for the execution of payments. As a functional subsystem of modern society, the economy can treat problems only insofar as they are communicated as matters of economic costs and benefits, otherwise it will regard them as`noise' and refrain from such operations.
Functional differentiation and exclusion
In Ecological Communication (1989) Luhmann tries to analyse the prospect of solving environmental problems within society. Again and again his analysis reveals a similar result: all subsystems of society are able to deal with problems of their environment insofar as these problems can be selected by the specific programs and submitted to the specific codes of a subsystem. The capacity of the society to solve problems is basically provided and limited by its functional differentiation. Within modern world society there is no position available that could represent the society as a whole. By consequence, all multifaceted problems need first to be compartmentalised and translated into issues that functionally specialised systems can handle. Luhmann frames this problem of articulation sharply in terms of inclusion and exclusion, by which he replaces an older semantics of social tensions, for instance, based on notions of classes and strata. With the shift from a stratified (premodern and early modern) society to a functionally differentiated (late modern) society, Luhmann (1997b) fears, the predominant relation is no longer hierarchical but is one defined along the lines of inclusion and exclusion. As stated by, amongst others, Albert:`.
.. the poorest of the poor, people living in favelas, for example, seem not even to be addressed by the economic or the political system any longer. They cannot even be seen to be`exploited' or`oppressed' (for which purpose they would still have to form communicative addresses in both the economic and political systems). Bodies that are reduced to plain existence and only seek to reach the next day cease to be addresses for the economic and political systems since there is nothing left to be exploited or suppressed. The problem is that this`exclusionary zone' of society seems to be increasing as a result of an ongoing functional differentiation. The question is how society will react to this accumulating of`unattended communication ' '' (1999, page 257) . Although Luhmann was very pessimistic about the potential of society to address complicated and varied problems, there are, obviously, ways to deal with complex problems. The quote from Albert, for instance, demonstrates the possibility of articulating various problems within the subsystem of science. But, of course, accepting`exclusion' as a problematic fact does not immediately provide income or political power to the inhabitants of favelas. On the other hand, if we are able to conceive of their exclusion as a favourable economic and political option, there must be possibilities to translate also their inclusion in such terms, which offers options for different decisions.
In addition to the programs, which also serve to make certain decisions of other systems available within a system, we would like to draw attention to nonspecialised systems. These may be organisations like nongovernmental organisations, or just thematically unspecified communications in interactionsösuch as informal everyday conversations. As these social systems are not restricted to a specific code, they are able to both imitate and transgress the communicative limitations of functional systems. Ordinary conversations, for instance, may offer blueprints for operations within politics, economy, science, or other functionally specialised subsystems of society.
Furthermore, according to Luhmann, functional differentiation does not condemn the subsystems of society to a static existence. New systems may differentiate themselves within society while others may merge. Programs and codes may be replaced by newer versions. Keeping in mind that all operations of autopoietic systems are only determined by internal selectivity, but never by other systems, we may interpret the dynamic of social differentiation as a non-Darwinist form of coevolution. This dynamic, which is neither centrally steered nor following a plan, is certainly both a way out of old pressing problems and an entry into new ones.
Luhmann's social science
A social theory without subjects and bodies?
According to Luhmann's classification of systems, human beings are`sliced' into organic, psychic, and social systems. The human body appears as a physical carrier for psychic and social systems. The`subject' and its`actions' are regarded as central figures of modern communications (see Luhmann, 1997a , pages 1016^1036) and as highly problematic elements of outdated sociological terminologies (page 32). The main purpose of these notions is to serve as`attributions' in order to make communications visible' and hence accountable (Sta« heli, 2000a) .
In principle, theories of difference can start anywhere. The advantage of the distinction between system and environment is that it deploys a basic concept that incorporates activity and identity, dynamics and persistence, at the same time. Furthermore, by introducing concepts of self-reference and autopoiesis, the theoretical schema offers a wide range of possibilities for analysing the social as structured communication. Yet, this is achieved without falling into either structuralist or voluntarist traps. In the end this leads to a theory that conceives of the social as a self-constituted sphere. It denies not the dependence of communication on psychic systems, organisms, and the material world, but the potential of these levels to exert influence on communication. For Luhmann, corporeality remains a trivial premise of social life (1995, page 246), although he sees in corporeality``the general and, in specific contexts, also the specific, if not the downright decisive, premise of connective operations'' (page 247). However, Luhmann does not provide an exhaustive or systematic elaboration of the corporeality and spatiality of communication. Conceiving``the human being fully and completely, with body and soul, as a part of the environment of the system of society'' (1997a, page 30, our translation) seems to relieve him from developing a concept of social systems and of communication that also integrates their physical existence in minds, bodies, time(s), and space(s).
What about space(s), corporeality, and geography?
From the perspective of autopoietic-systems theory, society consists of communication, and communication emerges exclusively from communication. In terms of its structures, the social is a sealed realm, and the role of the environment is at best to provide the necessary preconditions for social systems. Provided that social geography deals with the spatiality of the social in the broadest sense, how could spatial aspects be integrated into Luhmann's theory of social systems?
On the one hand, one could argue that the environment of communication never affects the operations of social systems. The environment would then enter the social world only as a theme or topic within communication. This is indeed the position taken by Luhmann in his Ecological Communication (1989). Consequently, a geography of social systems would analyse the use of spatial or ecological semantics. This might still include themes ranging from cosmologies to sense of place, from international relations to regional autonomy, from house and garden romanticism to environmental policies, from natural resource management to the price of genetically engineered life, and so on.
On the other hand, one could also reflect on the context in which any communication occurs. According to Luhmann's perspective it is apparently irrelevant where and when communication takes place, and who is communicating.
This stands in stark contrast to the common experience that religious beliefs, political positions, consumer preferences, moral convictions, and many other dispositions for operations of social systems are highly dependent on particular persons. Moreover, often biographical episodes and many situational conditions are taken into account as factors of what is said. In social theory, concepts of situated and embedded knowledge have gained general acceptance. Following this perspective, it is indispensable to include the corporeality and spatiality of communication systematically within any social theory. In the remaining part of this paper we will further elaborate the premise that who is talking with whom, and under what circumstances, matters.
Taking Luhmann further
Social systems, time, and space Unfortunately for social geography, Luhmann does not provide us with an elaborate notion of space. When he writes about space or of spatiality he refers only to locations and distances on the surface of the earth. This stands in stark contrast to his notion of time, which is an epistemological concept and is thereby related to basic operations of autopoietic systems. If we were to extend Luhmann's deliberations on the temporal into the spatial, what would such a conception of space look like?
Autopoietic-systems theory interprets time as the reentry of a distinction (Krause, 1999, page 172) . When a system constitutes itself, it draws a difference between system and environment by carrying out two subsequent operations: distinction and indication (Rasch and Wolfe, 2000, page 36). First it distinguishes two sides and then it indicates one of these sides as the system (or the observer). As these operations are consecutive they constitute or`consume' time. All observations are thus temporal: one cannot be on both sides of a distinction at the same time. Introducing a difference in time is one of the operations that autopoietic systems use in order to`unfold' (or solve) the paradox of reentering distinctions (or the self-application of a code).
Luhmann's epistemological notion of time carries a whole string of implications with it. The first and most obvious is that the sequence of operations constitutes an internal time-reference for the system, on which it may synchronise internal and external observations as well as`perceive' events, changes, developments, and other temporalisations.
``To cope with these consequences of a re-entry of the internal/external difference in itself, the system needs and constructs time. It needs a memory function to discriminate forgetting and remembering. Its past is given a highly selected present and, in this sense, a reality'' (Luhmann, in Rasch and Wolfe, 2000, page 37) .
From an epistemological point of view the fact that not all observations can be realised simultaneously is very important as it is precisely this condition that allows the system to operate in highly selective ways. Later observations may allow the system to see what earlier observations did not or could not see. Therefore time does not only constitute reality, it also allows the processing of selectivity, learning, and evolution. Within Luhmannian systems theory, time is neither a container for systems nor a quality of systems. Rather, it is an internal frame of reference that autopoietic systems use in and for their operations, and which provides them with the possibility of creating or representing order and of unfolding paradoxes.
Unfortunately, Luhmann's treatment of space is less systematic and is even ambivalent. When he refers to space, he usually speaks of spatial codes in observed communications and of places, distances, and regions in an unreflected sense of ordinary language. From such statements we cannot derive a definition of space that parallels Luhmann's epistemological notion of time.
Fortunately, he left us with at least one fragmentary approach to a theory of space, which will support our interpretation of systems theory. It is a footnote in Social Systems (Luhmann, 1995, page 597) , where he discusses contradictions as products of internal operations of the system, which are not arbitrary but presuppose a frame of reference that constitutes them. Logics and space are given as two possibilities that`condition' or specify contradictions.`Space', for instance, is constituted by the assumption that one cannot take two different positions at the same time. Moreover, Luhmann suggests two possible conceptions of space: first, space as a sharp boundary that locates everything either on the one side or on the other; second, space as the extension of a spectrum that orders objects in terms of`closer' or`further' in relation to its end points and thereby establishes the reciprocal exclusivity of units of measurement.
In mathematical terms, what Luhmann refers to here are categorical distinctions and ordinal scales. In both cases, his notion of space functions as a dimension, a frame of reference that allows the observer to draw particular sorts of distinctions. Space is thus the potential of an observer to perceive (organic system), think (psychic system), or communicate (social system) differences. Space provides possible distinctions, whether we use terms, names, comparative expressions (larger, faster, etc), or numbers; it is by spatial reference that we apply specific forms of spaces.
As Luhmann conceives of time as the reentry of a distinction, times are always composed by several prior distinctions. In this specific sense space logically precedes time. While distinctions and reentries of distinctions represent space and time, respectively, in the first-order level, innumerable semantics of space and time of a second order may be developed based on these structures.
We might be tempted to take the`naked' binary distinction as the most basic of all forms. This would correspond to Aristotelian or classical logic, which is characteristic of modernistic thinking. However, it is unable to handle tautologies and paradoxes (the reflexive applications of codes) in a reasonable way. This would require taking not only distinctions, but also observations öthe unities of differencesöinto account. Therefore we emphasise a conception of space not as a quality of a distinction, but as its possibility. By excluding this possibility, the binary logic of distinctions defines it as a third position, which is at the same time the precondition of the distinction, as well as the`blind spot' of the observation. This kind of thinking leads to multivalued and`polycontextural' logic, as developed by Gotthard Gu« nter (Klagenfurt, 1995) .
As the difference between self-reference and other-reference is based upon a reentry of distinctionsöthe distinction of operationsöwe can conclude that, in Luhmann's theory, space constitutes distinctions, while time constitutes the autopoiesis of systems. In the words of Krause,``With the systems there comes time into the world'' (1999, page 218).
These epistemological notions are incompatible with a priori physicalistic interpretations of space and time, as such interpretations imply a precedent distinction between meaning and matter. To draw such a distinction, however, would already presuppose a specific dimension, and, consequently, some kind of space in our sense. Although Luhmann rejects all transcendental a priori meaning öa position that is consistent with our notion of space and his notion of time öhis classification of systems is discussed neither as a contingent assumption, nor as a purely formal differentiation. Rather, it reflects an unacknowledged acceptance of some sort of Cartesian dualism and of those meaning/matter and culture/nature binaries that are constitutive of modernity (Latour, 1993) and modern geography (Gren, 1994) . In this light, Luhmann's theory can be interpreted as the latest effort in the secularisation of the social sphere, by which the social is identified with communication and declared as operationally independent from all other powers in the world. Might this have contributed to Luhmann's conceptual neglect of the corporeality of communication?
Space, time, and society Inasmuch as environments do not determine the operations of social systems, neither corporeality nor physical aspects of spatiality can have direct influence on the content of communication. In Luhmann's theory, communication at best can refer to corporeal entities, environmental conditions, and the use of spatial codes. Moreover, in the first chapter of his The Society of the Society (1997a, pages 16^35) Luhmann leaves no doubt that he rejects all conceptions of society that take conceptual departure from human beings and territorial containers:`H umanistic and regionalist (national) conceptions of society can no longer offer theoretical satisfaction; they survive only as habits of everyday conversation'' (pages 31^32, our translation). Once again, it appears that Luhmann leaves no place for a social geography of autopoietic systems. However, there are many passages in his work, particularly those on writing and the mass media (1996) , where he acknowledges the specific relevance of corporeality and spatiality for the continuation of communication. The following observation illustrates that Luhmann regards the mobility or immobility of human beings and material items as decisive for the evolution of the structures and the themes of communication.`E ven in the Middle Ages the evolution of semantics depended decisively on circumstances such as, in which library certain manuscripts were stored, and what accidents lead readers to those texts, that then stimulated new ideas. Indeed, here the bodies of individuals, and therefore their locations, played an important role. This increasingly changed with the distribution of printed materials. The fact that in the 18th century societal integration was left to`public opinion' implied a renunciation of spatial integration, if not integration per se'' (1997a, page 314, our translation). For Luhmann, spatial integration denotes the range of possibilities that systems are able to realise, whereby their degree of freedom depends on the spatiotemporal conditions of access to communicators and texts. Any changes in these conditions and every movement costs time and absorbs scarce resources (1997a, page 314), the implication being that the environment`enters' communication not only at the level of themes of communication, but also at the level of organising continuity of communication. Organisms, psychic systems, and social systems must be accessible to each other in order to allow observation and communication to take place. Communication is of course organised only within social systems and not in other systems. Semantics of locations, environmental conditions, functional requirement, social and legal status, etc regulate the sequential selection of operations within social systems. Within the functional specialised subsystems of society it is primarily the task of programs to coordinate the operations of social, psychic, and organic systems among each other and in relation to their physical environments.
The economy, for instance, provides varied information that allows distinguishing whether a payment can or should take place. The relevance of social circumstances as well as the conditions of the physical locations and times of production, consumption, and transactions of property are translated into monetary termsösuch as, for instance, prices of goods, interest rates, or transportation costs. Moreover, all kinds of address lists, lists of goods, maps, and other kinds of information systems allow the planning, executing, and controlling of access to communication and of physical mobility. In similar ways other social systems constitute their conditions that govern the realisation of internal operations. All frames of reference are contingent products of social evolution, but those codes that refer to purely physical space and time are characteristic of modernity.
Interaction systems and accessibility systems
In respect of the coordination of operations of social systems, the notion of interaction systems may serve as a conceptual point of departure. For Luhmann,`interaction' is a synonym for the copresence of psychic systems, and he refers to social systems in copresence as`interaction systems'. According to Luhmann, only face-to-face communication allows psychic systems to be available to each other in the mode of mutual awareness. Interaction systems provide a kind of substratum for the functional systems of society:`T he large forms of social subsystems swim on a sea of continuously newly created and again dissolved small systems'' (1997a, page 812, our translation). Interaction systems work primarily with the difference of presence/absence (pages 814^818).
From a sociogeographical point of view, interaction systems are but a starting point for what Pred (1977) once called the`choreography of existence', which is the general spatiotemporal organisation of the social sphere. Luhmann defined interactions as communication in copresence (1995, pages 405^436), and he had a keen interest in the evolution of writing, printing, and all subsequent communication technologies (1996; 1997a, pages 249^315) . Nevertheless, he did not conceptually address the subtle differentiations in copresence or accessibility that various communication technologies allow. Talking to each other in different rooms through open doors, waving hands across the surface of a lake, or making telephone calls around the world are very obvious, yet varied, forms of copresence. Even exchanges of e-mails within a short period of time create a certain form of copresence. Yet, none of these contacts would fulfil Luhmann's criterion of copresence, as he uses a very restricted concept of interaction systems. We therefore propose to extend it by taking various degrees or forms of mediation into account.
Our body is the most immediate field of expression, which, however, finds extension in various ways, not least through communication technologies. We argue furthermore that these mediated interactions are as well planned, carried out, and controlled as the more immediate ones. We believe that it is reasonable to drop the criterion of face-to-face copresence and think of interaction systems as the different structures of mutual accessibility of psychic systems. We regard the extension of interaction systems into the realm of technically mediated communication, from signs and written texts to electronic telecommunication, as a necessary consequence of thisWhereas accessibility systems primarily refer only to the maintenance of a specific network of encounters with various entities, Luhmann's notion of organisation denotes the structures of functionally dependent decisions. Organisations are autopoietic systems that produce decisions out of decisions (1997a, page 830). Organisations create possibilities for decisions that would otherwise not exist, and they do not necessarily involve specific forms of physicality. They are only networks of specialised communications.
For Luhmann the concept of organisation seems to replace the concept of division of labour in conventional sociological terminology. Nevertheless, he includes the positioning of human beings in his definition. Organisations realise themselves through the membership of individuals (Krause, 1999, pages 40^41; Luhmann, 1997a, pages 828^830) . Individuals, however, are only accessible as organisms öthat is, physical units. Moreover, many operations within organisations öfor example, economic productionöalso involve various material items. Paraphrasing materialist terminologies, Krause (1999, page 41) speaks of an organisational infrastructure of functional subsystems of society. Our conclusion is, thus, that organisations rely on systems of accessibility and that they necessarily involve a specific coordination of social, psychic, organic, and allopoietic systems.
There is no coordination of communication without a material infrastructure, including the worldwide ecosphere. We cannot see any reason why, within a theory of social systems, the coordination of psychic systems, organisms, and allopoietic systems should not be conceptually represented. In this respect, Luhmann's work suffers from certain shortcomings. However, these are not intrinsic to the logic of a theory of autopoietic systems at all.
The regional differentiation of world society
For Luhmann there is only one contemporary society, and this is the modern functionally differentiated world society (1997a, pages 156^157). It constitutes itself as a continuous network of communication.
Nevertheless, while actually acknowledging this fact, many sociologists neglect to address the implications and draw the necessary conclusions. Instead, they still conceive of societies in terms of nation-states, as containers and regionalised culturesöprecisely the perspectives that Luhmann rejects (1997a, pages 158^159 ).
Of course there are territorial states and regional differences, but these exist as internal differentiations of world society (Albert, 1999; Luhmann, 1997a, pages 808^809; . Regional boundaries per se do not have the operational quality of establishing distinctions between communication and noncommunication, or between inclusion and exclusion. According to Luhmann, it makes no sense to say that they separate societies (1997b). On the contrary, it is exactly the overall functional differentiation of world societyöfor instance, in the form of the world marketöthat provides possibilities for regionally uneven shares in benefits and disadvantages (1997a, page 163). In particular, rational selections within functional systems tend to amplify deviancies instead of equality:``Those who already have money or income, get also easier credit'' (page 167, our translation). This is just one example of the``sharp difference of inclusion/ exclusion and the corresponding pauperisation of vast segments of populations'' (page 168, our translation) that are so typical of the implementation of functional systems. The question is, then, in what ways and where do the functional systems hinder each other and how do organisations handle access (for instance, to legal security or education). Still, all these qualities cannot legitimate the conventional social science assumptions and views of regional societies.
Within the modern functionally differentiated society, segmentary or spatial differentiation regulates the application of the binary codes under various social and natural conditions. The political system plays a key role in the regional differentiation of the world society: it differentiates itself into states, which subsequently provide regionalised conditions for other functional systems (Luhmann, 1997a, page 167) . Territorial states represent regional cultural and economic differences and, insofar as they are formal democracies, they organise the implementation of the majority/minority code of the political system on a global scale (1998, page 376) . Segmentary differentiation is realised through organisations and accessibility systems.`I n the contemporary society the interregionality is based upon the operations and cooperations of organisations, particularly of the economy, the mass media, politics, science and traffic'' (1997a, page 165, our translation). In the absence of segmentary differentiation, however, spatial borders are rather meaningless for the universalistic and specialised functional systems (page 809).
Geographers and social systems theory
A geography based on a theory of autopoietic systems would be a social rather than a human geography. Human beings do not provide a terminological point of departure, and there is not a transcendental a priori distinction between human and nonhuman. Furthermore, such a geography cannot restrict itself to the analysis of communication or social systems in the narrow sense, but would have to take relations between different kinds of systems into account. Within Luhmann's terminology, a geography of social systems would have to integrate accessibility systems and organisations systematically.
The contributions of geographers so far to the theory of autopoietic systems are marginal. Moreover, their works set out primarily at the level of spatial codes within communications, but not at the level of relations between different kinds of systems and their environmentsöwhich comprises the level of accessibility systems. However, Klu« ter (1986; has written comprehensively about the use of spatial codes in interactions and organisations, and Beier (1995) has applied a similar perspective to investigate the centralisation of the administration in Indonesia. Several other geographers have referred selectively to Luhmann for some of their arguments öfor example, Bahrenberg and Kuhm (1999) , Gren (1994) , Hard (1986; , and Simmons (1993) . Yet, within systems theory a fully developed geography is still missing. As time^space semantics serve to coordinate communication, their analysis certainly belongs to the core of a geography of social systems. In this respect the work of Klu« ter is indeed exemplary. Consequently, if social geography would restrict itself to the domain of spatial representations within face-to-face interactions and organisations, its task would be the (critical) rationalisation of spatial codes, as made evident by Klu « ter (1986, page 168; 1994, page 166) .
In the light of our reconstruction of systems theory, however, there are problems involved. The first is that such a geography of spatial semantics does not take secondorder observation systematically into account. Scientific observations of communications are second-order observations. They are able to observe the blind spot of first-order observations, and both the first-order observation and its environment are regarded as parts of their environment. Focusing, like Klu« ter, exclusively on spatial codes of first-order observations means to conceptually ignore their environment and blind spots. Precisely the key problem of realising strings and networks of communication through accessibility systems and organisations and the problem of coordinating different kinds of systems, would fall out of sight. Also there would not be a place for the relation between the specific choreography of existence and the specific continuity of communication.
The second set of problems is related to the conception of space. Klu« ter (1986; 1994) takes spatial semantics as abstractions that serve for spatial orientation. Yet, this presupposes a physical space`out there', which is occupied by things and that can be represented. Any such conception of object on the one side and subjective representation on the other implies a transcendental distinction between matter and meaning that is not compatible with nonrepresentational epistemologies, such as autopoietic-systems theory.
Concluding remarks
Luhmann's systems theory is constructed in such a way that it provides a terminological and conceptual framework to observe social phenomena of all kinds. Although it is cast only as a specific perspective, and therefore as a contingent possibility, it is universal in the sense that it encapsulates a way of conceptualising the whole world. Nothing is a priori excluded by the theory. Moreover, as``every social contact is understood as a system, up to and including society as the inclusion of all possible contacts'' (Luhmann, 1995, page 15) , the theory of social systems, like most other constructivist social theories, claims to be a metatheory of social science and the humanities, including social geography.
Our reconstruction of Luhmann's theory had to be selective and many interesting topics had to be excluded. Yet, we would like to touch upon one issue briefly: namely, has Luhmann a hidden political agenda? Luhmann is a sharp critic of all sorts of normative and utopian pretensions in social theory. He was often perceived as a functionalist, a technocrat, and a neoliberal, if not a conservative (Arnoldi, 2001 , page 1; Bailey, 1997, pages 83^84) . In our view such qualifications are simplistic and not really justified, as his epistemology of difference shows strong parallels with poststructuralist perspectives. Indeed, several authors draw connections between Luhmann, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, and poststructuralist thought in general (for example, Pottage, 1998; Rasch and Wolfe, 2000; Sta« heli, 2000b; Teubner, 2001) . His constructivism and his affinity to paradoxes stand in sharp contrast to fundamentalist and metaphysical claims of all sorts. Solidarity, justice, communicative rationality, and other`regulative ideas' are conventions, and, as such, are constitutive of modern society, but not immune to critique. Luhmann's concept of functional differentiation may flatter liberals, just as his references to the structures of inclusion and exclusion will discomfort them. In spite of his general resistance to normativity, precisely his efforts to neither reduce society to individuals, nor dissolve individuals within society, could be interpreted as a normative position. To desist from treating human beings in a simplistic manner might be a demanding ethical position.
What about the possibilities of a human geography of social systems? At first sight it seems to be doomed to failure because human beings and other things are located in the environment of society. A closer investigation of the reasons for this distinction, however, reveals actually the opposite. Precisely because communication, experiences, organisms, and other entities are clearly kept apart, instead of being combined in notions such as`landscape',`region', or`city', the specific autonomies and dynamics of these spheres can be accurately taken into account. We criticised Luhmann for failing to elaborate coherently enough the relations between social systems, interaction systems, and organisations. Most social systems and organisations, in particular, depend on a very specific coordination of psychic systems, organisms, and other entities. A geography of social systems would focus on the relations between communication and its environment. It could be developed as a theory that focuses on accessibility systems. However, as this theory rejects all transcendental presuppositions, the distinction of classes of systems should also be understood as a contingent concept with only instrumental value.
In order to avoid empirical presumptions and metaphysical implications, our geography of social systems sets out from purely formal notions of space and time. The traditional geographical space`out there'öwhether as a concrete materiality or as a mental representationöis rejected in favour of space as the two sides of a distinction. Given that this notion of space is empirically empty, it is universal. Based on this firstorder concept, geography could operate with a plurality of second-order spaces that already imply some empirical informationöfor instance, the distinction between meaning and matter. In this light, the concretistic notions of space as a representable entity, which populate the geographical literature, are then nothing but contingent, and typically modern, instruments of observation with limited use value.
In this paper we have introduced Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems and demonstrated the possibility of developing it further into a geography of autopoietic systems. Its main cornerstones are a conception of space as the possibility of drawing distinctions, and an analytical focus on accessibility systems and organisations.
